54 citations · 74 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
It Doesn't Take a Thief: Optical-Scan Voting Systems Fail Even Without Adversaries
Aleksander Essex, Philip B. Stark
Optical-scan voting systems and their supporting ecosystem of people, processes, and technology are fallible. While a substantial body of work examines adversarial threats to such…
A Declaration of Software Independence
Wojciech Jamroga, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider +2
A voting system should not merely report the outcome: it should also provide sufficient evidence to convince reasonable observers that the reported outcome is correct. Many deploye…
Stylish Risk-Limiting Audits in Practice
Amanda K. Glazer, Jacob V. Spertus, Philip B. Stark
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can use information about which ballot cards contain which contests (card-style data, CSD) to ensure that each contest receives adequate scrutiny, witho…
Adaptively Weighted Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections: AWAIRE
Alexander Ek, Philip B. Stark, Peter J. Stuckey +1
An election audit is risk-limiting if the audit limits (to a pre-specified threshold) the chance that an erroneous electoral outcome will be certified. Extant methods for auditing…
Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: ONEAudit
Philip B. Stark
Card-level comparison risk-limiting audits (CLCAs) heretofore required a CVR for each cast card and a "link" identifying which CVR is for which card -- which many voting systems ca…
Ballot-Polling Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections with a Dirichlet-Tree Model
Floyd Everest, Michelle Blom, Philip B. Stark +3
Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is used in several countries around the world. It requires voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and uses a counting algorithm that is more…