activity
20232026
collaborators

7 papers

q-fin.TR2026

Trading in CEXs and DEXs with Priority Fees and Stochastic Delays

Philippe Bergault, Yadh Hafsi, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt

We develop a mixed control framework that combines absolutely continuous controls with impulse interventions subject to stochastic execution delays. The model extends current impul…

q-fin.TR2025

Optimal Exit Time for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers

Philippe Bergault, Sébastien Bieber, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt

We study the problem of optimal liquidity withdrawal for a representative liquidity provider (LP) in an automated market maker (AMM). LPs earn fees from trading activity but are ex…

q-fin.TR2025

Competition and Incentives in a Shared Order Book

René Aïd, Philippe Bergault, Mathieu Rosenbaum

Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this p…

q-fin.TR2025

Optimal hedging of an informed broker facing many traders

Philippe Bergault, Pierre Cardaliaguet, Wenbin Yan

This paper investigates the optimal hedging strategies of an informed broker interacting with multiple traders in a financial market. We develop a theoretical framework in which th…

q-fin.TR2025

Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers

Alif Aqsha, Philippe Bergault, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt

We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by…

q-fin.TR2024

A Mean Field Game between Informed Traders and a Broker

Philippe Bergault, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt

We find closed-form solutions to the stochastic game between a broker and a mean-field of informed traders. In the finite player game, the informed traders observe a common signal…

math.OC2023

Mean Field Games in a Stackelberg problem with an informed major player

Philippe Bergault, Pierre Cardaliaguet, Catherine Rainer

We investigate a stochastic differential game in which a major player has a private information (the knowledge of a random variable), which she discloses through her control to a p…