5 papers
Beyond Best Response: Quantal Stackelberg Deception as Insurance Against Attacker Misspecification
Asif Rahman, Md. Abu Sayed, Ahmed Ann Noor Ryen +3
Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) assume that an attacker observes the defender's strategy and chooses the target that maximizes their expected utility perfectly. In most realistic…
Planning Stealthy Backdoor Attacks in MDPs with Observation-Based Triggers
Xinyi Wei, Shuo Han, Ahmed H. Hemida +2
This paper investigates backdoor attack planning in stochastic control systems modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). A backdoor attack involves an adversary deploying a poli…
Cyber Deception for Mission Surveillance via Hypergame-Theoretic Deep Reinforcement Learning
Zelin Wan, Jin-Hee Cho, Mu Zhu +3
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are valuable for mission-critical systems like surveillance, rescue, or delivery. Not surprisingly, such systems attract cyberattacks, including Den…
Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Md Abu Sayed, Asif Rahman, Ahmed Hemida +2
This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We…
Active Inference through Incentive Design in Markov Decision Processes
Xinyi Wei, Chongyang Shi, Shuo Han +3
We present a method for active inference with partial observations in stochastic systems through incentive design, also known as the leader-follower game. Consider a leader agent w…