3 papers
cs.CR2026
Beyond Best Response: Quantal Stackelberg Deception as Insurance Against Attacker Misspecification
Asif Rahman, Md. Abu Sayed, Ahmed Ann Noor Ryen +3
Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) assume that an attacker observes the defender's strategy and chooses the target that maximizes their expected utility perfectly. In most realistic…
eess.SY2026
Planning Stealthy Backdoor Attacks in MDPs with Observation-Based Triggers
Xinyi Wei, Shuo Han, Ahmed H. Hemida +2
This paper investigates backdoor attack planning in stochastic control systems modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). A backdoor attack involves an adversary deploying a poli…
cs.CR2026
Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Md Abu Sayed, Asif Rahman, Ahmed Hemida +2
This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We…