13 citations · 54 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers · 1 filter
Dependent Types for Extensive Games
Pierre Lescanne
Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assista…
The risk of divergence
Pierre Lescanne
We present infinite extensive strategy profiles with perfect information and we show that replacing finite by infinite changes the notions and the reasoning tools. The presentation…
Intelligent escalation and the principle of relativity
Pierre Lescanne
Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance in an auction), the agents play forever. The -game is an extremely simple infinite game with intelligent agents in which es…
A simple case of rationality of escalation
Pierre Lescanne
Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. In particul…
Bubbles are rational
Pierre Lescanne
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an…
Rationality and Escalation in Infinite Extensive Games
Pierre Lescanne
The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people…
On the Rationality of Escalation
Pierre Lescanne, Perrinel Matthieu
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. He…
On the Rationality of Escalation
Pierre Lescanne, Perrinel Matthieu
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. He…
Feasibility/Desirability Games for Normal Form Games, Choice Models and Evolutionary Games
Pierre Lescanne
An abstraction of normal form games is proposed, called Feasibility/Desirability Games (or FD Games in short). FD Games can be seen from three points of view: as a new presentation…
Deconstruction of Infinite Extensive Games using coinduction
Pierre Lescanne
Finite objects and more specifically finite games are formalized using induction, whereas infinite objects are formalized using coinduction. In this article, after an introduction…
Conversion/Preference Games
Stéphane Le Roux, Pierre Lescanne, René Vestergaard
We introduce the concept of Conversion/Preference Games, or CP games for short. CP games generalize the standard notion of strategic games. First we exemplify the use of CP games.…
(Mechanical) Reasoning on Infinite Extensive Games
Pierre Lescanne
In order to better understand reasoning involved in analyzing infinite games in extensive form, we performed experiments in the proof assistant Coq that are reported here.
Dynamic Logic of Common Knowledge in a Proof Assistant
Pierre Lescanne, Jérôme Puisségur
Common Knowledge Logic is meant to describe situations of the real world where a group of agents is involved. These agents share knowledge and make strong statements on the knowled…