39 citations · 197 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers · 1 filter
RiLACS: Risk-Limiting Audits via Confidence Sequences
Ian Waudby-Smith, Philip B. Stark, Aaditya Ramdas
Accurately determining the outcome of an election is a complex task with many potential sources of error, ranging from software glitches in voting machines to procedural lapses to…
A Unified Evaluation of Two-Candidate Ballot-Polling Election Auditing Methods
Zhuoqun Huang, Ronald L. Rivest, Philip B. Stark +2
Counting votes is complex and error-prone. Several statistical methods have been developed to assess election accuracy by manually inspecting randomly selected physical ballots. Tw…
Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting Audits: SHANGRLA
Philip B. Stark
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced to testing sets of null hypotheses of the form "the average of this list is not greater than 1/2" for a…
They may look and look, yet not see: BMDs cannot be tested adequately
Philip B. Stark, Ran Xie
Bugs, misconfiguration, and malware can cause ballot-marking devices (BMDs) to print incorrect votes. Several approaches to testing BMDs have been proposed. In logic and accuracy t…
Bernoulli Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits
Kellie Ottoboni, Matthew Bernhard, J. Alex Halderman +2
We present a method and software for ballot-polling risk-limiting audits (RLAs) based on Bernoulli sampling: ballots are included in the sample with probability , independently.…
Risk-Limiting Audits by Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections (SUITE)
Kellie Ottoboni, Philip B. Stark, Mark Lindeman +1
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) offer a statistical guarantee: if a full manual tally of the paper ballots would show that the reported election outcome is wrong, an RLA has a known mi…