4 papers
The Game Changer Problem: Controlling Equilibria with Discrete Rewards
Brandon Han, Young Wu, Shiyun Cheng +1
We introduce the game changer problem, where an external designer modifies a game's reward matrix to make a target pure action profile the unique equilibrium, subject to the constr…
Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration
Jason Jisen Li, Young Wu, Yancheng Zhu +2
The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechani…
Optimally Installing Strict Equilibria
Jeremy McMahan, Young Wu, Yudong Chen +2
In this work, we develop a reward design framework for installing a desired behavior as a strict equilibrium across standard solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash…
The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment
Young Wu, Yancheng Zhu, Jin-Yi Cai +1
When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influe…