11 citations · 12 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Cycles in Liquid Democracy: A Game-Theoretic Justification
Markus Brill, Rachael Colley, Anne-Marie George +3
A common criticism of liquid democracy within the relevant academic literature is that delegation cycles can occur, seemingly resulting in unused voting power. Yet, practitioners a…
Measuring and Controlling Divisiveness in Rank Aggregation
Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, César Hidalgo +2
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements amon…
Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View
Manon Revel, Niclas Boehmer, Rachael Colley +3
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) me…
Measuring a Priori Voting Power -- Taking Delegations Seriously
Rachael Colley, Théo Delemazure, Hugo Gilbert
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our pow…
Understanding Political Divisiveness using Online Participation data from the 2022 French and Brazilian Presidential Elections
Carlos Navarrete, Mariana Macedo, Rachael Colley +8
Digital technologies can augment civic participation by facilitating the expression of detailed political preferences. Yet, digital participation efforts often rely on methods opti…
Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation
Linus Boes, Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi +2
Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multi-agent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective v…
Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations
Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, Arianna Novaro
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple…