7 citations · 17 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Optimal MEV Extraction Using Absolute Commitments
Daji Landis, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We propose a new, more potent attack on decentralized exchanges. This attack leverages absolute commitments, which are commitments that can condition on the strategies made by othe…
Stackelberg Attacks on Auctions and Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Daji Landis, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We study an auction with identical items in a context where agents can arbitrarily commit to strategies. In general, such commitments non-trivially change the equilibria by…
Which Games are Unaffected by Absolute Commitments?
Daji Landis, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an ag…
Side Contract Commitment Attacks on Blockchains
Daji Landis, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts, because agents may themselves deploy smart contracts (side contracts). Typically, equilibria of game…
Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors
Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We study a scenario where an adjudication task (e.g., the resolution of a binary dispute) is outsourced to a set of agents who are appointed as jurors. This scenario is particularl…
Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts
Mathias Hall-Andersen, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental gam…
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing
Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken i…
An Incentive-Compatible Smart Contract for Decentralized Commerce
Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach
We propose a smart contract that allows two mutually distrusting parties to transact any non-digital good or service by deploying a smart contract on a blockchain to act as escrow.…