activity
20212023
most citedBoosting Big Brother: Attacking Search Engines with Encodings

9 citations · 13 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

cs.CR2023

Automatic Bill of Materials

Nicholas Boucher, Ross Anderson

Ensuring the security of software supply chains requires reliable identification of upstream dependencies. We present the Automatic Bill of Materials, or ABOM, a technique for embe…

cs.CR2023

When Vision Fails: Text Attacks Against ViT and OCR

Nicholas Boucher, Jenny Blessing, Ilia Shumailov +2

Text-based machine learning models are vulnerable to an emerging class of Unicode-based adversarial examples capable of tricking a model into misreading text with potentially disas…

cs.CR2023

If it's Provably Secure, It Probably Isn't: Why Learning from Proof Failure is Hard

Ross Anderson, Nicholas Boucher

In this paper we're going to explore the ways in which security proofs can fail, and their broader lessons for security engineering. To mention just one example, Larry Paulson prov…

cs.CR2023★ 9 cited

Boosting Big Brother: Attacking Search Engines with Encodings

Nicholas Boucher, Luca Pajola, Ilia Shumailov +2

Search engines are vulnerable to attacks against indexing and searching via text encoding manipulation. By imperceptibly perturbing text using uncommon encoded representations, adv…

cs.CR2023★ 1 cited

Threat Models over Space and Time: A Case Study of E2EE Messaging Applications

Partha Das Chowdhury, Maria Sameen, Jenny Blessing +5

Threat modelling is foundational to secure systems engineering and should be done in consideration of the context within which systems operate. On the other hand, the continuous ev…

cs.CR2022★ 3 cited

Talking Trojan: Analyzing an Industry-Wide Disclosure

Nicholas Boucher, Ross Anderson

While vulnerability research often focuses on technical findings and post-public release industrial response, we provide an analysis of the rest of the story: the coordinated discl…

cs.CR2021

Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities

Nicholas Boucher, Ross Anderson

We present a new type of attack in which source code is maliciously encoded so that it appears different to a compiler and to the human eye. This attack exploits subtleties in text…