1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
A polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We provide the first polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings in the classical one-to-one matching model. By modifying the classical stability constraints, we i…
A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets
Lucero Quevedo Mauricio, Paola Manasero, Pablo Neme +1
This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coinci…
Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define p…
Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we…
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implement…
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result gener…