4 citations · 10 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Pablo Neme
We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cove…
Justifiable Priority Violations
Josué Ortega, R. Pablo Arribillaga
Making Deferred Acceptance more efficient requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? We argue that a priority can be justifiably violated if the affected student…
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a u…
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…
A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Eliana Pepa-Risma
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed…
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule tha…
Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coars…
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
We prove that any stable matching mechanism suffers from systematic inefficiency of striking magnitude: in large random markets, any stable allocation is Pareto-inefficient with hi…
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manip…
Obvious Manipulations in Matching without and with Contracts
R. Pablo Arribillaga, E. Pepa Risma
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It…
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable wh…
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…