4 citations · 4 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a u…
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…
A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Eliana Pepa-Risma
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed…
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule tha…
Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coars…
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable wh…