1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2026
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms
Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +2
In auction design with limited information about bidders' value distributions, we provide an optimality foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We show that simple dominant-st…
econ.TH2022★ 1 cited
Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification
Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the prin…
econ.TH2020
Information Design in Optimal Auctions
Yi-Chun Chen, Xiangqian Yang
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their bi…