60 citations · 76 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms
Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +2
In auction design with limited information about bidders' value distributions, we provide an optimality foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We show that simple dominant-st…
Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification
Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the prin…
Implementation with Uncertain Evidence
Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen
We study a full implementation problem with a state unknown to the designer but known to agents, where agents have uncertain evidence privately drawn from state-dependent distribut…
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima
Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun +1
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical…
Direct Implementation with Evidence
Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun
We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if…
Assortment Optimization under the Decision Forest Model
Yi-Chun Akchen, Velibor V. Mišić
We study the problem of finding the optimal assortment that maximizes expected revenue under the decision forest model, a recently proposed nonparametric choice model that is capab…
The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs
Yi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh M Pai
We propose a new simple procedure called Population-Mean-Based Aggregation (PMBA) that enables a principal to "aggregate" information about an unknown state of the world from agent…
Information Design in Optimal Auctions
Yi-Chun Chen, Xiangqian Yang
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their bi…
Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice
Yi-Chun Chen, Velibor V. Mišić
Customer behavior is often assumed to follow weak rationality, which implies that adding a product to an assortment will not increase the choice probability of another product in t…
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Event-Driven Multi-Agent Decision Processes
Kunal Menda, Yi-Chun Chen, Justin Grana +4
The incorporation of macro-actions (temporally extended actions) into multi-agent decision problems has the potential to address the curse of dimensionality associated with such de…
Learning Discrete Bayesian Networks from Continuous Data
Yi-Chun Chen, Tim Allan Wheeler, Mykel John Kochenderfer
Learning Bayesian networks from raw data can help provide insights into the relationships between variables. While real data often contains a mixture of discrete and continuous-val…