2 citations · 3 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2023★ 2 cited
Auction Design for Value Maximizers with Budget and Return-on-spend Constraints
Pinyan Lu, Chenyang Xu, Ruilong Zhang
The paper designs revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms for agents who aim to maximize their total obtained values rather than the classical quasi-linear utilities. Several models…
cs.GT2022★ 1 cited
Multiagent MST Cover: Pleasing All Optimally via A Simple Voting Rule
Bo Li, Xiaowei Wu, Chenyang Xu +1
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigni…