3 papers
econ.GN2026
Daycare Matching with Siblings: Social Implementation and Welfare Evaluation
Kan Kuno, Daisuke Moriwaki, Yoshihiro Takenami
In centralized matching markets, agents may value joint assignment, as with siblings or couples. Standard preference estimation ignores such complementarities, complicating welfare…
cs.GT2024
Stable Matchings in Practice: A Constraint Programming Approach
Zhaohong Sun, Naoyuki Yamada, Yoshihiro Takenami +2
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities…
cs.GT2022
Daycare Matching in Japan: Transfers and Siblings
Zhaohong Sun, Yoshihiro Takenami, Daisuke Moriwaki +2
In this paper, we study a daycare matching problem in Japan and report the design and implementation of a new centralized algorithm, which is going to be deployed in one municipali…