3 papers
econ.TH2024
Three Variations on Money Pump, Common Prior, and Trade
Ziv Hellman, Miklos Pinter
We consider finite information structures, and quest for the answer of the question: What is the proper definition of prior? In the single player setting we conclude that a probabi…
math.OC2022
The -core and the -balancedness of TU games
David Bartl, Miklós Pintér
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva-Shapley T…
math.OC2022
On Balanced Games with Infinitely Many Players: Revisiting Schmeidler's Result
David Bartl, Miklós Pintér
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is b…