1 citations · 2 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Differentiable Normative Guidance for Nash Bargaining Solution Recovery
Moirangthem Tiken Singh, Surajit Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar
Autonomous artificial intelligence agents in negotiation systems must generate equitable utility allocations satisfying individual rationality (IR), ensuring each agent receives at…
Intelligent Machines and Incomplete Information
Sujata Goala, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Surajit Borkotokey
The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced fi…
Weighted Myerson value for Network games
Niharika Kakoty, Surajit Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar +1
We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and ind…
How to choose a Compatible Committee?
Ritu Dutta, Rajnish Kumnar, Surajit Borkotokey
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the l…
Weighted position value for Network games
Niharika Kakoty, Surajit Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar +1
In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the…
The Expected Shapley value on a class of probabilistic games
Surajit Borkotokey, Sujata Gowala, Rajnish Kumar
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exog…
Consolidating Marginalism and Egalitarianism: A New Value for Transferable Utility Games
D. Choudhury, S. Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar +1
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shaple…
The component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for Network Games
Surajit Borkotokey, Sujata Goala, Niharika Kakoty +1
We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division ru…
Expected Values for Variable Network Games
Subhadip Chakrabarti, Loyimee Gogoi, Robert P Gilles +2
A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a net…