4 citations · 12 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Majoritarian Assignment Rules
Felix Brandt, Haoyuan Chen, Chris Dong +2
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assi…
Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions
Patrick Lederer
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has…
Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences.…
Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Martin Bullinger, Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer +1
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While t…
Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules
Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer
In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the cand…
Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains
Felix Brand, Patrick Lederer, Sascha Tausch
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom…
Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules
Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While the…
Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Théo Delemazure, Tom Demeulemeester, Manuel Eberl +2
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In part…
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study th…
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characteriz…
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain)…
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has s…