1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Algorithms for Robbins' Problem using Markov Decision Processes
Léonard Brice, F. Thomas Bruss, Anirban Majumdar +1
In this paper, we consider Robbins' problem, which is a full information variant of the well-known secretary selection problem. In this version of the problem, the goal is to minim…
Pessimism of the Will, Optimism of the Intellect: Fair Protocols with Malicious but Rational Agents
Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, Mathieu Sassolas +2
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is hon…
Rational verification and checking for Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria in graph games
Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, Marie van den Bogaard
We study two natural problems about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: checking problems, that consist in deciding…
Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)
Léonard Brice, Marie van den Bogaard, Jean-François Raskin
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To thi…
The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-payoff Games
Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, Marie van den Bogaard
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (…
On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games
Léonard Brice, Marie van den Bogaard, Jean-François Raskin
We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives.…
Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games
Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, Marie Van Den Bogaard
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To thi…