3 citations · 3 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Contracting with Imperfect Commitment: Minimal Canonical Contracts
Seungjin Han, Siyang Xiong
Contract theory typically assumes full commitment by the principal, but many contracts fix some payoff-relevant decisions while leaving others discretionary. We ask when imperfect…
Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms: a simple full characterization
Siyang Xiong
We study Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms, and provide a surprisingly simple full characterization, which is in sharp contrast to the classical, albeit complicated, ful…
Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Characterization
Siyang Xiong
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice function…
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima
Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun +1
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical…