6 papers
A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets
Lucero Quevedo Mauricio, Paola Manasero, Pablo Neme +1
This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coinci…
Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define p…
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market.…
Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
Nadia Guiñazú, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We f…
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of…
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it?…