8 papers
A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets
Lucero Quevedo Mauricio, Paola Manasero, Pablo Neme +1
This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coinci…
Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define p…
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Pablo Neme
We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cove…
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena, Pablo Neme
We study coalition formation problems in the presence of externalities, focusing on settings where agents exhibit myopic expectations, that is, they evaluate potential deviations b…
Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem
Adriana Amieva, AgustÃn G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we invest…
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market.…