4 papers
A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Auctions
Xu Lang
We study games of chance (e.g., pokers, dices, horse races) in the form of agents' first-order posterior beliefs about game outcomes. We ask for any profile of agents' posterior be…
Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information
Eric van Damme, Xu Lang
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is…
Symmetric reduced form voting
Xu Lang, Debasis Mishra
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule…
Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case
Xu Lang
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative…