7 papers
Multiwinner Voting with Spatial Preferences under Incomplete Information
Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1
In multiwinner elections with many candidates, as in participatory budgeting or large-scale recommendation, voters cannot plausibly evaluate every candidate, yet standard proportio…
Interbank Lending Games
Jinyun Tong, Bart de Keijzer, Haoxiang Wang +1
We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by ea…
The Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Primary Elections
Colin Cleveland, Bart de Keijzer, Maria Polukarov
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first inf…
Multiwinner Voting with Interval Preferences under Incomplete Information
Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explo…
Optimal Candidate Positioning in Multi-Issue Elections
Colin Cleveland, Bart de Keijzer, Maria Polukarov
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in , and each voter supports th…
The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis +1
One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these…