activity
20222026
most citedAutomated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing

55 citations · 84 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

On the Geographic Incentives of Multiple Concurrent Proposers

Kushal Babel, Jason Milionis, Eric Xue

We study whether systems with multiple concurrent proposers (MCP) incentivize the geographic decentralization of proposers. In our model, concurrent proposers strategically choose…

cs.GT2026

On testing the incentive compatibility of single-parameter allocation mechanisms

Jason Milionis, William Pires

This paper is the first work at the intersection of game theory and property testing, giving algorithms and lower bounds for efficiently testing whether an allocation mechanism is…

cs.GT2025

Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure

Jason Milionis, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau +2

We introduce the first formal model capturing the elicitation of unverifiable information from a party (the "source") with implicit signals derived by other players (the "observers…

cs.GT2024

Swim till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game

Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou +1

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equ…

cs.GT2023★ 5 cited

A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers

Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden

In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Nash, Conley, and Computation: Impossibility and Incompleteness in Game Dynamics

Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras +1

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or conti…