5 citations · 15 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a u…
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena, Pablo Neme
We study coalition formation problems in the presence of externalities, focusing on settings where agents exhibit myopic expectations, that is, they evaluate potential deviations b…
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Federico Fioravanti
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abs…
Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economies with multidimensional single-peaked preferences
Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-…
Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule tha…
Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem
Adriana Amieva, Agustín G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we invest…
Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we…
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it?…
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manip…
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Agustin G. Bonifacio
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictato…
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable wh…
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
Agustin G. Bonifacio
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting…
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions a…
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships.…
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable ma…
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of s…
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Elena Inarra, Pablo Neme
Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process…