3 citations · 6 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Market Clearing with Semi-fungible Assets
Theo Diamandis, Tarun Chitra, Guillermo Angeris
As markets have digitized, the number of tradable products has skyrocketed. Algorithmically constructed portfolios of these assets now dominate public and private markets, resultin…
The Convex Geometry of Network Flows
Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris
In this paper, we derive a number of interesting properties and extensions of the convex flow problem from the perspective of convex geometry. We show that the sets of allowable fl…
Solving the Convex Flow Problem
Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris
In this paper, we introduce the solver ConvexFlows for the convex flow problem first defined in the authors' previous work. In this problem, we aim to optimize a concave utility fu…
Convex Network Flows
Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris, Alan Edelman
We introduce a general framework for flow problems over hypergraphs. In our problem formulation, which we call the convex flow problem, we have a concave utility function for the n…
Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal
Guillermo Angeris, Theo Diamandis, Ciamac Moallemi
In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. I…
The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +1
Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple…
The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +2
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framewor…
A Note on the Welfare Gap in Fair Ordering
Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris
Public blockchains group submitted transactions into batches, called blocks. A natural question is how to determine which transactions are included in these batches. In this note,…
An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers
Theo Diamandis, Max Resnick, Tarun Chitra +1
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural questio…
Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets
Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra +1
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible un…
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Alex Evans +1
We consider the problem of optimally executing an order involving multiple crypto-assets, sometimes called tokens, on a network of multiple constant function market makers (CFMMs).…
Replicating Monotonic Payoffs Without Oracles
Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra
In this paper, we show that any monotonic payoff can be replicated using only liquidity provider shares in constant function market makers (CFMMs), without the need for additional…