23 citations · 36 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
The Power of Matching for Online Fractional Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, René Romen, Alexander Schlenga
We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and…
Welfare Approximation in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, Vaggos Chatziafratis, Parnian Shahkar
Partitioning a set of items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing…
Settling the Complexity of Popularity in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, Matan Gilboa
We study coalition formation in the framework of hedonic games. There, a set of agents needs to be partitioned into disjoint coalitions, where agents have a preference order over c…
Stability in Random Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, Sonja Kraiczy
Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formati…
Robust Popular Matchings
Martin Bullinger, Gergely Csáji, Rohith Reddy Gangam +1
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popula…
Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Martin Bullinger, Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer +1
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While t…
Stability in Online Coalition Formation
Martin Bullinger, René Romen
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous…
Online Coalition Formation under Random Arrival or Coalition Dissolution
Martin Bullinger, René Romen
Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively s…
Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation
Niclas Boehmer, Martin Bullinger, Anna Maria Kerkmann
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition fo…
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures
Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaëlle Wilczynski
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this…
Topological Distance Games
Martin Bullinger, Warut Suksompong
We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for oth…
Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets
Johannes Bäumler, Martin Bullinger, Stefan Kober +1
We study a dynamic matching setting where homogeneous agents arrive at random according to a Poisson process and randomly form edges yielding a sparse market. Agents stay in the ma…
Network Creation with Homophilic Agents
Martin Bullinger, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko
Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically…
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has s…
Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation
Martin Bullinger, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study…