2 citations · 4 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Colonel Blotto Games
Martin Bichler, Abheek Ghosh
Colonel Blotto is a fundamental resource-allocation game in which two players divide their budgets across battlefields, and the higher allocation on each battlefield wins its value…
Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time b…
Best-Response Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
Abheek Ghosh
We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex cost functions (these games always have a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). We show that be…
Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests
Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in lottery contests. We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the (unique) equilibrium for homogeneous agents but…
Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific cri…
Contests to Incentivize a Target Group
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul Goldberg
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a…
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a play…