10 citations · 11 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Competitive Sequential Screening
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel, Jan Knoepfle
We study competition between firms that contract with consumers before the consumers fully learn their product preferences. In a Hotelling duopoly, firms screen consumers by offeri…
Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
A quota mechanism, such as a mandatory grading curve, links together multiple decisions. We analyze the performance of quota mechanisms when the number of linked decisions is finit…
Comment on Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010) "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
We correct a gap in the proof of Theorem 2 in Matsushima et al. (2010).
Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
Ian Ball, Jan Knoepfle
A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working incr…
Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future
Ian Ball
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signa…
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions"
Ian Ball, Matt O. Jackson, Deniz Kattwinkel
We correct a bound in the definition of approximate truthfulness used in the body of the paper of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). The proof of their main theorem uses a different…
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers
Ian Ball, James Bono, Justin Grana +3
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examp…
Scoring Strategic Agents
Ian Ball
I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score…