1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2022★ 1 cited
Information-Robust Optimal Auctions
Wanchang Zhang
A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently…
econ.TH2022
Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors
Wanchang Zhang
I consider a mechanism design problem of selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has minimal amount of information. I assume that the designer only knows the u…
econ.TH2022
Robust Private Supply of a Public Good
Wanchang Zhang
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows t…