2 citations · 3 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms
Nir Bachrach, Yi-Chun Chen, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +2
In auction design with limited information about bidders' value distributions, we provide an optimality foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We show that simple dominant-st…
Information-Robust Optimal Auctions
Wanchang Zhang
A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently…
Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors
Wanchang Zhang
I consider a mechanism design problem of selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has minimal amount of information. I assume that the designer only knows the u…
Robust Private Supply of a Public Good
Wanchang Zhang
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows t…
Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism
Wanchang Zhang
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works…
Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions
Wanchang Zhang
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the co…