3 papers
econ.TH2022
The Blocker Postulates for Measures of Voting Power
Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta
A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is;…
econ.TH2022
A General Framework for a Class of Quarrels: The Quarrelling Paradox Revisited
Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel po…
econ.TH2021
A Recursive Measure of Voting Power that Satisfies Reasonable Postulates
Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta
We design a recursive measure of voting power based on partial as well as full voting efficacy. Classical measures, by contrast, incorporate solely full efficacy. We motivate our d…