1 citations · 2 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2026
Information for nothing and authority for free
Deniz Kattwinkel, Alexander Winter
A principal must decide whether to implement a project. She privately knows the cost, an agent privately knows the benefit. Monetary transfers are not available, and compared to th…
econ.TH2024★ 1 cited
Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
Deniz Kattwinkel, Alexander Winter
A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We…
econ.TH2022★ 1 cited
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser +1
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always pre…