2 citations · 3 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Delegated Information Provision
Francesco Bilotta, Christoph Carnehl, Justus Preusser
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker. The experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating t…
Tight Samurai Accountant
Deniz Kattwinkel, Justus Preusser
This note applies tightness (Kattwinkel and Preusser (2025)) to the setting of Border and Sobel (1987, "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder"). Border and Sobel cha…
Waiting for Trade in Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty
Justus Preusser
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive acco…
The Division of Surplus and the Burden of Proof
Deniz Kattwinkel, Justus Preusser
A principal and an agent divide a surplus whose size is known only to the agent. The agent decides how much to reveal initially. Both parties can acquire costly evidence to verify…
Designing Scientific Grants
Christoph Carnehl, Marco Ottaviani, Justus Preusser
This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers' incentives, and grant design. Grants d…
Optimal Allocation with Peer Information
Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in v…
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser +1
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always pre…