1 citations · 1 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2024
Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening
Patrick Lahr, Axel Niemeyer
We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transf…
econ.TH2024
Optimal Allocation with Peer Information
Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in v…
econ.TH2022★ 1 cited
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser +1
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always pre…