1 citations · 2 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Information for nothing and authority for free
Deniz Kattwinkel, Alexander Winter
A principal must decide whether to implement a project. She privately knows the cost, an agent privately knows the benefit. Monetary transfers are not available, and compared to th…
Competitive Sequential Screening
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel, Jan Knoepfle
We study competition between firms that contract with consumers before the consumers fully learn their product preferences. In a Hotelling duopoly, firms screen consumers by offeri…
Tight Samurai Accountant
Deniz Kattwinkel, Justus Preusser
This note applies tightness (Kattwinkel and Preusser (2025)) to the setting of Border and Sobel (1987, "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder"). Border and Sobel cha…
Who and How? Adverse Selection and flexible Moral Hazard
Henrique Castro-Pires, Deniz Kattwinkel, Jan Knoepfle
We characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments with hidden types and flexible hidden actions. Our approach introduces extended recommendation schedules that also p…
The Division of Surplus and the Burden of Proof
Deniz Kattwinkel, Justus Preusser
A principal and an agent divide a surplus whose size is known only to the agent. The agent decides how much to reveal initially. Both parties can acquire costly evidence to verify…
Robust Robustness
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
We propose a refinement of the maxmin approach to robustness. A mechanism's payoff guarantee over an ambiguity set is robust if the guarantee is approximately satisfied at priors n…
Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
Deniz Kattwinkel, Alexander Winter
A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We…
Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
A quota mechanism, such as a mandatory grading curve, links together multiple decisions. We analyze the performance of quota mechanisms when the number of linked decisions is finit…
Comment on Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010) "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
We correct a gap in the proof of Theorem 2 in Matsushima et al. (2010).
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser +1
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always pre…
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions"
Ian Ball, Matt O. Jackson, Deniz Kattwinkel
We correct a bound in the definition of approximate truthfulness used in the body of the paper of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). The proof of their main theorem uses a different…