3 papers
cs.GT2026
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios +3
Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance gua…
cs.GT2025
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
cs.GT2025
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis +2
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interest…