29 citations · 58 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
19 papers
Equilibrium Play Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Equilibrium play in two-player zero-sum games is usually justified via epistemic assumptions, such as mutual knowledge of rationality and beliefs, that go far beyond the rationalit…
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…
Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium
Florian Brandl
We characterize correlated equilibrium in finite normal-form games. Interpreting correlated strategies as action recommendations, we show that correlated equilibrium is the unique…
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice Revisited
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Brandl et al. (2016) characterized a probabilistic social choice function known as maximal lotteries within a framework based on fractional preference profiles, which abstracts awa…
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) stric…
A Natural Adaptive Process for Collective Decision-Making
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now, let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred a…
Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl
Rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue, which has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public. We consider a rationing pro…
The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl
We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to…
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model…
Belief-Averaged Relative Utilitarianism
Florian Brandl
We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is in…
Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
We consider social welfare functions that satisfy Arrow's classic axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality when the outcome space is the convex hull…
The Distribution of Optimal Strategies in Symmetric Zero-sum Games
Florian Brandl
Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the colum…
Popular Matchings with Multiple Partners
F. Brandl, T. Kavitha
Our input is a bipartite graph where each vertex in has a preference list strictly ranking its neighbors. The vertices in and in are called st…
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl +1
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be man…
The Impossibility of Extending Random Dictatorship to Weak Preferences
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong
Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that n…
Welfare Maximization Entices Participation
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of cla…
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the cont…
An Application of Fixed-point Theory to Probabilistic Social Choice
Florian Brandl
The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties…
Existence of Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation Games
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl
In this paper, we examine \emph{hedonic coalition formation games} in which each player's preferences over partitions of players depend only on the members of his coalition. We pre…