4 citations · 5 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Rewarding Informed Voting in PoS Governance
Juan Beccuti, Manvir Schneider
We study reward design for delegated representatives who acquire costly information and vote on a binary governance proposal. Effort improves both private information and delegated…
Effects of Vote Delegation in Blockchains: Who Wins?
Hans Gersbach, Manvir Schneider, Parnian Shahkar
This paper investigates which alternative benefits from vote delegation in binary collective decisions within blockchains. We begin by examining two extreme cases of voting weight…
Staking Pools on Blockchains
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
On several proof-of-stake blockchains, agents engaged in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake in order to earn higher returns. We develo…
Vote Delegation with Unknown Preferences
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under convention…
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance ta…