3 papers
econ.TH2026
Rawlsian Assignments
Tom Demeulemeester, Juan S. Pereyra
We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Existing literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; cons…
econ.TH2026
Local non-bossiness
Eduardo Duque, Juan S. Pereyra, Juan Pablo Torres-MartÃnez
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a studen…
econ.TH2024
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen, Juan S. Pereyra
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The stude…