activity
20212026
most citedSoK: Blockchain-Based Decentralized AI (DeAI)

2 citations · 3 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

math.NT2026

A Complete Answer to Erdős Problem 690

Shouqiao Wang, Davide Crapis

Let \(d_k(p)\) denote the natural density of positive integers whose \(k\)-th smallest prime divisor is \(p\). Erdős asked whether, for each fixed \(k\), the sequence \(p\mapsto d_…

cs.AI2026

Profit is the Red Team: Stress-Testing Agents in Strategic Economic Interactions

Shouqiao Wang, Marcello Politi, Samuele Marro +1

As agentic systems move into real-world deployments, their decisions increasingly depend on external inputs such as retrieved content, tool outputs, and information provided by oth…

cs.GT2025

A Framework for Combined Transaction Posting and Pricing for Layer 2 Blockchains

Shouqiao Wang, Davide Crapis, Ciamac C. Moallemi

This paper presents a comprehensive framework for transaction posting and pricing in Layer 2 (L2) blockchain systems, focusing on challenges stemming from fluctuating Layer 1 (L1)…

cs.CR2025

GOD model: Privacy Preserved AI School for Personal Assistant

PIN AI Team, Bill Sun, Gavin Guo +7

Personal AI assistants (e.g., Apple Intelligence, Meta AI) offer proactive recommendations that simplify everyday tasks, but their reliance on sensitive user data raises concerns a…

cs.LG2024★ 2 cited

SoK: Blockchain-Based Decentralized AI (DeAI)

Elizabeth Lui, Rui Sun, Vatsal Shah +5

Centralization enhances the efficiency of Artificial Intelligence (AI) but also introduces critical challenges, including single points of failure, inherent biases, data privacy ri…

cs.GT2024

MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets

Jonah Burian, Davide Crapis, Fahad Saleh

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tic…

cs.GT2024

The Cost of Permissionless Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers

Julian Ma, Davide Crapis

Automated market makers (AMMs) allocate fee revenue \textit{proportional} to the amount of liquidity investors deposit. In this paper, we study the economic consequences of the com…

cs.AI2023

Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices

Xinyuan Sun, Davide Crapis, Matt Stephenson +3

Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy, integrity, and…

cs.GT2023

EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies

Davide Crapis, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili

We study the economics of the Ethereum improvement proposal 4844 and its effect on rollups' data posting strategies. Rollups' cost consists of two parts: data posting and delay. In…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources

Davide Crapis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Shouqiao Wang

We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compu…

cs.GT2021

Driver Positioning and Incentive Budgeting with an Escrow Mechanism for Ridesharing Platforms

Hao Yi Ong, Daniel Freund, Davide Crapis

Drivers on the Lyft rideshare platform do not always know where the areas of supply shortage are in real time. This lack of information hurts both riders trying to find a ride and…