1 citations · 1 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
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Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness
David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin, Kangning Wang
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winn…
A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
Jason Hartline, Kangning Wang
We provide a geometric proof that the random proposer mechanism is a -approximation to the first-best gains from trade in bilateral exchange. We then refine this geometric analy…
Metric Distortion for Tournament Voting and Beyond
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Zihan Tan +1
In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that se…
Approximately Dominating Sets in Elections
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a…
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Samples
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +2
We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states…