6 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption
Martin Unterguggenberger, Lukas Lamster, David Schrammel +2
Efficient cloud computing relies on in-process isolation to optimize performance by running workloads within a single process. Without heavy-weight process isolation, memory safety…
EC-CFI: Control-Flow Integrity via Code Encryption Counteracting Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Salmin Sultana, Hans Liljestrand +5
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escape…
SCFI: State Machine Control-Flow Hardening Against Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Martin Unterguggenberger, Rishub Nagpal +3
Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardw…
SERVAS! Secure Enclaves via RISC-V Authenticryption Shield
Stefan Steinegger, David Schrammel, Samuel Weiser +2
Isolation is a long-standing challenge of software security. Traditional privilege rings and virtual memory are more and more augmented with concepts such as capabilities, protecti…