10 citations · 10 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechan…
Information Cascades and Social Learning
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Omer Tamuz +1
We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a relatively integrated and accessible way the more important themes, insights and appl…
Selling Two Identical Objects
Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministi…