activity
20212026
most citedTowards Understanding Knowledge Distillation

132 citations · 273 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

17 papers

cs.CR2026

GDM AI Control Roadmap

Mary Phuong, Erik Jenner, Laurent Simon +4

AI agents are rapidly accelerating work at frontier AI companies, helping with AI R&D, cyber-defence, and advancing scientific discoveries. As these agents become more tightly inte…

cs.CY2026

The 2026 Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Stephen Casper, Oskar Galeev, Yoshua Bengio +117

Frontier AI capabilities and autonomy are advancing rapidly. A growing number of real-world incidents make a trusted AI ecosystem essential to embracing AI with confidence. The 202…

cs.LG2026

Multi-Agent AI Control: Distributed Attacks Hamper Per-Instance Monitors

Oliver Makins, Orazio Angelini, Zohreh Shams +1

AI control is a family of techniques to prevent an AI with malicious goals from subverting its operator's intent. AI Control usually studies a single agent in one trajectory, but r…

cs.LG2026

Generalization Hacking: Models Can Game Reinforcement Learning by Preventing Behavioral Generalization

Frank Xiao, Mary Phuong

Model post-training, and in particular reinforcement learning (RL), is one of the primary mechanisms by which developers can shape models' values and behaviors. However, as models…

cs.LG2026

Bootstrapped Monitoring: Leveraging Transparent Reasoning to Oversee Stronger AI Agents

Frank Xiao, Mary Phuong

Trusted monitoring is a cornerstone of AI control. However, as frontier models grow more capable, the increasing capabilities gap between trusted and untrusted models may render tr…

cs.CR2026

Phantom Transfer: Data Poisoning can Survive Data-Level Defences

Andrew Draganov, Tolga H. Dur, Anandmayi Bhongade +1

We present a data poisoning attack -- Phantom Transfer -- with the property that, even if you know precisely how the poison was placed into an otherwise benign dataset, you cannot…

cs.AI2025

Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectives

Chloe Li, Mary Phuong, Daniel Tan

As AI systems become more capable of complex agentic tasks, they also become more capable of pursuing undesirable objectives and causing harm. Previous work has attempted to catch…

cs.CR2025

LLMs Can Covertly Sandbag on Capability Evaluations Against Chain-of-Thought Monitoring

Chloe Li, Mary Phuong, Noah Y. Siegel

Trustworthy evaluations of dangerous capabilities are increasingly crucial for determining whether an AI system is safe to deploy. One empirically demonstrated threat is sandbaggin…

cs.AI2025★ 2 cited

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Elizabeth Barnes +38

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known A…

cs.AI2025

CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoring

Benjamin Arnav, Pablo Bernabeu-Pérez, Nathan Helm-Burger +3

As AI models are deployed with increasing autonomy, it is important to ensure they do not take harmful actions unnoticed. As a potential mitigation, we investigate Chain-of-Thought…

cs.LG2025

Evaluating Frontier Models for Stealth and Situational Awareness

Mary Phuong, Roland S. Zimmermann, Ziyue Wang +6

Recent work has demonstrated the plausibility of frontier AI models scheming -- knowingly and covertly pursuing an objective misaligned with its developer's intentions. Such behavi…

cs.CY2025

From Stability to Inconsistency: A Study of Moral Preferences in LLMs

Monika Jotautaite, Mary Phuong, Chatrik Singh Mangat +1

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate into our daily lives, it becomes crucial to understand their implicit biases and moral tendencies. To address this, we introd…

cs.LG2024★ 11 cited

Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities

Mary Phuong, Matthew Aitchison, Elliot Catt +24

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evalu…

cs.AI2023★ 59 cited

Model evaluation for extreme risks

Toby Shevlane, Sebastian Farquhar, Ben Garfinkel +18

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to ca…

cs.LG2022★ 16 cited

Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goals

Rohin Shah, Vikrant Varma, Ramana Kumar +4

The field of AI alignment is concerned with AI systems that pursue unintended goals. One commonly studied mechanism by which an unintended goal might arise is specification gaming,…

cs.LG2022★ 53 cited

Formal Algorithms for Transformers

Mary Phuong, Marcus Hutter

This document aims to be a self-contained, mathematically precise overview of transformer architectures and algorithms (*not* results). It covers what transformers are, how they ar…

cs.LG2021★ 132 cited

Towards Understanding Knowledge Distillation

Mary Phuong, Christoph H. Lampert

Knowledge distillation, i.e., one classifier being trained on the outputs of another classifier, is an empirically very successful technique for knowledge transfer between classifi…