3 papers
cs.GT2022
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li +1
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effor…
cs.GT2021
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which the agent has a private type and settings in which the agent takes a hidden action. Many practical problems,…
cs.GT2021
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash +1
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "common agency" model of [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986]. This model combines the challenges of coordinating multi…