8 papers · 1 filter
Adjusted Winner: from Splitting to Selling
Robert Bredereck, Bin Sun, Eyal Briman +1
The Adjusted Winner (AW) method is a fundamental procedure for the fair division of indivisible resources between two agents. However, its reliance on splitting resources can lead…
Maximizing Index Diversity in Committee Elections
Paula Böhm, Robert Bredereck, Till Fluschnik
We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee's diversity into account. One model aims to find a commit…
How to Tamper with a Parliament: Strategic Campaigns in Apportionment Elections
Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, MichaÅ Furdyna +6
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats bas…
Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments
Paula Böhm, Robert Bredereck, Till Fluschnik
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of levels. We introduce s…
How to Resolve Envy by Adding Goods
Matthias Bentert, Robert Bredereck, Eva Deltl +2
We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods. We give a characterization of the instances where envy can be r…
Putting Fair Division on the Map
Paula Böhm, Robert Bredereck, Paul Gölz +2
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online plat…