1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
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Individually-Fair Auctions for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search
Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, Nathaniel Sauerberg
We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadees…
Buy-Many Mechanisms for Many Unit-Demand Buyers
Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, Yifeng Teng +1
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constrai…
An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additive Valuations
Hannaneh Akrami, Rojin Rezvan, Masoud Seddighin
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- which requires that no agent prefers…