5 papers
Random Serial Dictatorship is -Envy-Free
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Louis-Roy Langevin +4
We analyze the house allocation problem, in which a set of agents must be matched to a set of objects for which they have cardinal utilities. A central mechanism for this problem i…
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation
Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the eg…
Tight Asymptotic Bounds for Fair Division With Externalities
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive posit…
Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division
Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Yuang Eric Shen
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of goods among agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint di…
Online Fair Division With Subsidy: When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist, and at What Cost?
Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items arriving online, among (offline) agents. Although envy-freeness has emerged as the archetypal fairness notion, e…